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a b s t r a c t
We test 12 individuals with congenital prosopagnosia (CP), who replicate a common pattern of showing
severe difﬁculty in recognising facial identity in conjunction with normal recognition of facial expres-
sions (both basic and ‘social’). Strength of holistic processing was examined using standard expression
composite and identity composite tasks. Compared to age- and sex-matched controls, group analyses
demonstrated that CPs showed weaker holistic processing, for both expression and identity information.eywords:
ace perception
dentity
xpression
motion
olistic processing
Implications are (a) normal expression recognition in CP can derive from compensatory strategies (e.g.,
over-reliance on non-holistic cues to expression); (b) the split between processing of expression and
identity information may take place after a common stage of holistic processing; and (c) contrary to a
recent claim, holistic processing of identity is functionally involved in face identiﬁcation ability.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.rosopagnosia
. Introduction
People with congenital prosopagnosia (CP; also referred to
s developmental prosopagnosia) have severe, life-long deﬁcits
ecognising the identity of familiar people from their faces despite
ntact low-level vision and general cognitive abilities (Behrmann &
vidan, 2005; Lee, Duchaine, Wilson, & Nakayama, 2010). As many
s 2.5% of the educated population can be classiﬁed as a CP (Bowles
t al., 2009; Kennerknecht et al., 2006), and some of these cases
un in families (Duchaine, Germine, & Nakayama, 2007; Grueter
t al., 2007; Lee et al., 2010; Schmalzl, Palermo, & Coltheart, 2008).
ace recognition deﬁcits in CP appear to be associated with smaller
nterior fusiform volumes (Behrmann, Avidan, Gao, & Black, 2007),
educed grey matter volume in brain regions that respond to faces,
uch as the mid-fusiform gyrus (Garrido et al., 2009), and com-
romised white matter tracts in occipito-temporal cortex (Thomas
t al., 2009).
Despite profound impairments in facial identity recognition,
any, although not all, CPs are adept at labelling the basic facial
∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, The Australian National
niversity, ACT 0200, Australia. Tel.: +61 2 6125 5545; fax: +61 2 6125 0499.
E-mail address: Romina.Palermo@anu.edu.au (R. Palermo).
028-3932/© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.
oi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.02.021expressions of happiness, anger, disgust, fear, sadness and surprise
(Kress & Daum, 2003; Nunn, Postma, & Pearson, 2001; Schmalzl
et al., 2008), even when the display of these basic expressions is
subtle and difﬁcult to categorise (Duchaine, Parker, & Nakayama,
2003; Humphreys, Avidan, & Behrmann, 2007). CPs are also typi-
cally able to recognise subtle social emotions conveyed by the eyes,
such as playfulness and regret (Duchaine et al., 2003, 2007; Lee
et al., 2010). In the present study we test 12 CPs showing this pat-
tern of impaired identity recognition with no discernable deﬁcit in
facial expression recognition, and examine the strength of holistic
processing for face expression information (in all 12 participants)
and face identity information (in a subset of nine participants), in
order to address three theoretical questions regarding the role of
holistic processing in their patterns of face processing abilities.
Holistic processing, deﬁned as the “simultaneous perception of
multiple features of an individual face, that are integrated into a
single global representation” (Rossion, 2008, p. 275), is a core per-
ceptual mechanism in the processing of faces. The most widely
accepted measure of holistic processing is the composite effect.
Assessing holistic coding of identity typically involves participants
identifying the top (or bottom) half of a face paired with the bot-
tom (or top) half of another person’s face. The composite effect is
the robust ﬁnding that participants are slower, and less accurate,
when the face halves are vertically aligned (forming the illusion of a
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pig. 1. (a) Identity composite task. Pairs of faces were shown sequentially and partic
n this example the top halves were the “same” in both the unaligned (left) and a
ndividual. Reprinted with kind permission from Le Grand et al. (2004). (b) Expressio
n which participants judged the expression from either the (i) top (fear) or (ii) bo
xpression. Face images are from the KDEF (Lundqvist et al., 1998).
ew face) compared towhen they are spatially unaligned so they do
ot resemble a whole face (e.g., McKone, 2008; Young, Hellawell, &
ay, 1987;e.g., Fig. 1a). In theexpressionversion,participants judge
he expression on one half of the face (e.g., anger) while trying to
gnore an inconsistent expression on the other half (e.g., happiness)
Calder & Jansen, 2005; Calder, Young, Keane, & Dean, 2000;White,
000; e.g., Fig. 1b). Composite effects for both types of information
ccur for upright faces (where identity and expression recognition
s typically also good) but not inverted faces (where recognition is
oorer).
The ﬁrst question we address in the current study is whether
he normal levels of expression recognition ability in our CPs
erive from normal use of perceptual mechanisms, as opposed
o reliance on other compensatory strategies. Patient H.J.A., who
cquired prosopagnosia at age 61 following a stroke, demonstrated
relatively normal ability to recognise facial expressions despite
isplaying no expression composite effect, implying the use of
ompensatory strategies (perhaps a reliance on local part cues)
Baudouin & Humphreys, 2006). This implies that there is no guar-
ntee that normal expression recognition ability in CP is achieved
ia the same perceptual mechanisms used by typically developing
dults. Here we test whether our CPs may rely less on holistic pro-
essing (and therefore more on other contributory mechanisms)
han controls.
The second question concerns the stage of processing from
hich the dissociation between identity and expression recogni-
ion derives. Common theories place the point of split between
rocessing of identity and expression information quite early ins judged whether the top halves of the faces were either the “same” or “different”.
(right) pairs. The bottom halves were always of a different individual to the top
posite task. Examples of unaligned (left) and aligned (right) composite expressions
(disgusted) halves of the face. The other half of the face was always of a different
perceptual/cognitive processing,with the split occurring before the
stage of view-independent ‘structural descriptions’ in the cogni-
tive model of Bruce and Young (1986), and before processing in
the lateral fusiform gyrus (identity) and superior temporal sul-
cus (expression) in the anatomical model of Haxby, Hoffman, and
Gobbini (2000). However, Calder andYoung’s (2005) reviewargued
that much of the evidence for an early split was not as strong as
often assumed.Here,we address the question ofwhether a split has
occurredby theperceptual stageofholistic processing.Weconsider
twomodels. In theﬁrst (ModelA, Fig. 2), there are twodistinct types
of holistic coding, one for coding expression and another for coding
information about identity. In support of this model, Calder et al.
(2000) found that participants could selectively attend to holistic
information speciﬁc to identity or expression (i.e., participants took
no longer to judge the facial expressionof a compositewhether they
were composed of the same or different identity and vice versa),
suggesting that holistic coding of identity and expression were
independent. However, as this data can also be modelled within
a single multi-dimensional system, there may not be an absolute
dissociation between the composite effect for expression and iden-
tity (Calder and Young, 2005). Alternatively then, there could be a
common stage of holistic coding, which feeds into both expression
and identity recognition (Model B, Fig. 2). In support of this model,
Calder and Jansen (2005) note that composite effects for both iden-
tity and expression are sensitive to inversion but not photographic
negative, suggesting a common level of perceptual processing.
In the current study, we assess whether holistic expression and
identity processing go together, or dissociate, in our CPs. Model
1228 R. Palermo et al. / Neuropsycholo
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Z-scores for upright faces, calculated using the age- and sex-based norms in Bowles
et al. (2009), ranged from 0.53 to −3.34 (Fig. 3).3
All 12 prosopagnosics completed the tests of facial expression recognition and
theexpressioncompositeeffect,whichwereadministeredbetween6and24months
after the identity tests (thus they were aged between 22 and 61 years; M=41.67,
1 The FACT was not administered to F47-8 and M57.
2 The CFMT z-score (−1.39) for F30-1 likely overestimates her face recogni-
tion skills as it was the second time she completed the test (the initial score six
weeks prior was not recorded due to computer malfunction) and controls, on aver-, there are two separate holistic processing stages, one for expression and one
or identity. In Model B, there is a holistic coding stage that is common to both
xpression and identity processing. Face image is from the KDEF (Lundqvist et al.,
998).
(two separate holistic processing stages) would be supported if
dissociation is revealed, that is, if one form of holistic process-
ng is impaired, while the other is intact. Given that the CPs had
mpaired recognition of identity but not expression, such a disso-
iation would most likely take the form of the CPs showing a weak
dentity composite effect relative to controls but a normal strength
xpression composite effect. Alternatively, Model B (one combined
olistic processing stage) would predict that the status of holistic
rocessing of expression should match that of identity (i.e., either
oth impaired, or both intact). For example, if CPs showed weak
omposite effects for identity information, thenModel Bwould also
redict weak composite effects for expression information despite
he CPs’ intact recognition of expressions.
The third question concerns identity processing only, and asks
hether holistic processing of identity information is functionally
elated to face recognition ability. A recent paper with typically
eveloping adults demonstrated large individual differences in the
trength of the identity composite effect but found no correla-
ion between these differences and face recognition ability (Konar,
ennett, & Sekuler, 2010). However, face recognition ability was
ssessed with simultaneous or immediate sequential matching
asks (where the stimuli included hair), and such tasks have been
hown to be more closely associated with general object process-
ng than face memory skills (e.g., the Glasgow Face Matching Task,
FMT; Burton, White, & McNeill, 2010). None of the CPs tested in
ur lab are impaired on the GFMT whereas they all show signiﬁ-
ant impairments on tests involving a memory component, such
s the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT) (unpublished data). In
he current study we used our group-based comparison of differ-gia 49 (2011) 1226–1235
ences in identity recognition ability (i.e., CPs vs. controls). If holistic
processing is not functionally involved in recognition, then there
should be no difference in the strength of the identity composite
effect between the CP and control groups. On the other hand, if
holistic coding contributes to face identity recognition, then the
identity composite effect should be weaker in CPs than in controls.
To summarise, we conﬁrmed impaired face identity with intact
facial expression recognition in a group of 12 individuals. We then
report the ﬁrst group study of holistic coding of both expression
and identity in CP.
2. Methods and results
2.1. Participants
2.1.1. Congenital prosopagnosics
The CP group comprised 12 people (4 males) who reported severe
everyday face recognition difﬁculties and performed poorly on tests of
facial identity recognition. Most contacted us via our prosopagnosia register:
http://www.maccs.mq.edu.au/research/projects/prosopagnosia/. They were aged
between 20 and 60 years (M=40.58, SD=13.00) when facial identity recognition,
low-level vision and IQwere assessed. They reportednormal or corrected-to-normal
vision and demonstrated normal range contrast sensitivity when measured with
the Functional Acuity Contrast Test (FACT, Vision Sciences Research Corporation,
2002)1 and colour perception as assessed with the Ishihara Test for Colour Blindness
(Ishihara, 1925). Performance on the length, size, orientation and picture naming
(longversion) subtests of theBirminghamObject RecognitionBattery (BORB) (Riddoch
&Humphreys, 1993) conﬁrmed intact basic-level object recognition in all prosopag-
nosics. IQ, as measured with the Raven Colored Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven,
& Court, 1998) was also within the normal range for all prosopagnosics. None of the
prosopagnosics reported any psychiatric or neurological problems.
The presence of prosopagnosia – that is, the inability to reliably recognise
facial identity – was determined using two tests of face memory and one of face
perception. As can be seen in Fig. 3, the individuals in the prosopagnosic group
performed poorly on these tests, and performed at least two standard devia-
tions (SDs) below control norms on one or more tests. The MACCS Famous Face
Test 2008 (MFFT-08) assesses memory for famous faces that have generally been
repeatedly seen over relatively long time periods (Palermo, Rivolta, Wilson, & Jef-
fery, in preparation). It contains 20 people famous to Australians and 20 that are
not. On each trial: (a) a face is presented and participants judge whether it is
familiar or not, (b) for the famous faces, they are asked to identify the face by
providing its name or other speciﬁc autobiographical information, then (c) the
famous person’s name and relevant autobiographical information are presented,
and participants report whether the famous person was actually known to them
(any that are unknown are excluded from further analyses). The score on the
MFFT-08 is the percentage of correctly recognised faces of known famous peo-
ple. A sample of 39 control participants (26 females) aged between 19 and 72
years (M=45.69, SD=16.08) correctly recognised 74.17% (SD=19.09) of known faces
(Palermo et al., in preparation). Age-appropriate z-scores based on these control
data were calculated for each prosopagnosic and vary from −0.95 to −4.39 (see
Fig. 3).
The Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT, Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006) assesses
face learning andmemory. Participants learn six individuals (each from three differ-
ent viewpoints), and then recognize the previously seen faces when shown in novel
views and/or degraded by noise. Total scores on the upright CFMTwere transformed
to age-adjusted z-scores (using age-based norms reported in Bowles et al., 2009),
with the prosopagnosics scoring between −1.39 and −2.83 below the Australian
sample (Fig. 3).2
The Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT, Duchaine et al., 2007) requires partic-
ipants to order a series of morphed faces in order of their likeness to a target face.age, improve 6.3 percentage points when re-tested approximately 6 months later
(Wilmer et al., 2010).
3 For the four CPs with normal-looking CFPT performance (F23-4, M53-5, M20-2,
M60-1), holistic coding strength was not consistently greater, or lower, than that of
the other prosopagnosics. Thus, we opted to include all 12 CPs whose performance
we assessed, on the basis that they are representative of the typical CP population.
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pig. 3. Z-scores of the 12 prosopagnosics on three tests of facial identity recognition,
ace Memory Test (CFMT, Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006) and the Cambridge Face P
heir age at completing the identity, and then expression, tests.
D=12.87). Nine (M=42.56, SD=14.52) also completed the identity composite test
F37-8, F37-9, and F30-1 did not).
Some of these participants are also referred to in Bowles et al. (2009); Rivolta,
alermo, Schmalzl, and Coltheart (in press), and Palermo et al. (in preparation).
.1.2. Controls
For the three facial expression recognition tests, the expression composite effect
nd the CFMT, our controls comprised 17 participants without known brain injury
7 males), who were aged between 19 and 60 years (M=38.94, SD=14.42). They
id not differ in age from the prosopagnosics, t<1. (Note that we initially tested 21
ontrol participants; however four were excluded, one for a CFMT z-score of −1.84,
ne for scoring below the ‘normal range’ cutoff given in the manual for the Ekman
0 Faces Test, and two for scoring below normal range cutoff values on both the
kman 60 Faces and the Emotion Hexagon Test).
The identity composite effect was completed by a different group of control
articipants; n=30 (7 males), aged between 23 and 62 years (M=34.20, SD=10.09).
nce again, age did not differ from the prosopagnosics, t(37) =1.96, p> .05.
.2. Tests of facial expression recognition and social cognition
Recognitionofbasic andsocial expressionswasassessedwith three tests, follow-
ng standard procedures. Results showed completely normal expression recognition
n the CP group relative to the 17 controls (Table 1).
The Ekman 60 Faces (Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002)
ontains grayscale photographs of 10 individuals, each displaying one of six high-
ntensity prototypical basic emotions. Faces are presented, in random order, for 5 s
ach, and participants choose which emotion term (anger, disgust, fear, happiness,
adness, and surprise) best describes the facial expression shown. The number of
orrect responses out of 60 was computed. The mean performance of the group of
rosopagnosics did not differ to that of our controls, t<1 (Table 1). Importantly, this
ack of difference cannot be attributed to a ceiling effect on the task (mean control
ccuracy was approximately 86%). We also conﬁrmed that none of the individual
rosopagnosics scored below cut-off scores that indicate the boundary between
ormal-range and impaired performance based on a large-N control sample as pro-
ided in the manual (i.e., 45 for ages 20–40, 43 for ages 41–60 and 41 for those aged
1–70 years).
The Emotion Hexagon Test (Young et al., 2002) consists of stimuli of graded
ifﬁculty, created by blending between two maximally confusable prototypical
xpressions (e.g., 90% happiness, 10% surprise; 70%, happiness, 30% surprise; 50%
appiness, 50% surprise; 70% happiness, 30% surprise; 10% happiness, 90% surprise).
ach of the thirtymorphed faces is shown once in each of 5 blocks, for 5 s, in random
rder. Participants choosewhich emotion term (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sad-
ess, and surprise) best describes the facial expression. Total correct score out of 120
as computed. The prosopagnosic and control groups did not differ, t<1 (Table 1),
lthough note performance was close to ceiling on this task (control mean=95%).
e also compared individuals to large-N sample cut-offs in the manual (94 for
ges 20–40, 92 for ages 41–60 and 90 for those aged 61–70 years). None of the
rosopagnosics scored below cut-off.ACCS Famous Face Test-08 (MFFT-08, Palermo et al., in preparation), the Cambridge
tion Test (CFPT, Duchaine et al., 2007). The prosopagnosics are labelled by sex and
The Reading theMind in the Eyes (Revised) test (Baron-Cohen,Wheelwright, Hill,
Raste, & Plumb, 2001) contains the eye-region of 36 faces displaying social emotions
(e.g., ﬂirtatious, pensive, sceptical). Participants are presented with four terms for
each set of eyes and circle which word best describes what the person in the photo-
graph was thinking or feeling. A page of word deﬁnitions is provided for reference.
Adults with autism are impaired on this test, suggesting that this test taps subtle
impairments in social intelligence (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al.). In the
present study, the prosopagnosic and control groups did not differ, t(27) =1.32, p> .2
(Table 1), with no ceiling effect (control mean=87%) and in fact a small trend for
the CP group to be better than controls. We further conﬁrmed intact social expres-
sion perception in our CPs via comparison to published norms for a large-N sample
from the general population (n=122,mean age=46.5 years, SD=16.9; Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Hill, et al.): the large-Nmeanwas 26.2 (SD=3.6), and the lowest score
here for a prosopagnosic was 25.
Participants also completed the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) questionnaire
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, & Clubley, 2001). None of the prosopag-
nosics scored 32 or above, which is indicative of an autism spectrum disorder
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al.), and there was no difference between
the prosopagnosics and controls, t(16.51, adjusted for unequal variance) =1.40,
p> .18 (Table 1). This is consistent with other recent work showing that CP
can be clearly distinct from autism in both adults (Duchaine, Murray, Turner,
White, & Garrido, 2009) and children (Wilson, Palermo, Schmalzl, & Brock,
2010).
2.3. Expression composite test
Each face displayed a composite of two emotions, one on the top half and a
different one on the bottomhalf (e.g., fear on the top togetherwith happiness on the
bottom, see Fig. 1b). This test was essentially the same as that of Calder et al. (2000,
Experiment 1), but with a different set of stimuli (because Calder et al. used the
Ekman and Friesen Pictures of Facial Affect that were also contained in the Ekman
60 Faces Test that participants in our study had already completed). As in Calder
et al., only expressions well recognised from the speciﬁc half were employed in that
half: for the top half of the face emotions used were anger, fear, sadness; and for
the bottom half of the face emotions used were happiness, disgust, surprise, of the
same individual.
2.3.1. Stimuli
The original whole faces (later used to make the composite stimuli) were
grayscale photographs of four Caucasian individuals (two females), each displaying
an angry, disgusted, fearful, sad, happy and surprised expression. The faces were
sourced from the NimStim Face Stimulus Set (Models # 7 and 8) (Tottenham et
al., 2009) and the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (KDEF, Models #
M09 and M17) (Lundqvist et al., 1998). A pilot study (n=13) conﬁrmed that the
whole face expressions were well recognised (average recognition accuracy was
86.86%). Each of these faces was divided in half along the bridge of the nose to cre-
ate the composite images. The pilot study also veriﬁed that participants were able
to accurately recognise anger, fear, and sadness from the top halves presented alone
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Table 1
Scores on the Ekman 60 Faces and Emotion Hexagon tests (Young et al., 2002), the Reading theMind in the Eyes test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), and the Autism Spectrum Quotient
(AQ) (1) for each of the prosopagnosics, and means and standard deviations for the prosopagnosic (n=12) and control (n =17) groups.
Ekman 60 Faces (/60) Emotion Hexagon (/120) Reading the Mind in the Eyes (/36) Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ)
Prosopagnosics
F23-4 55 119 33 16
F30-1 53 120 28 11
F33 51 120 31 11
F37-8 52 115 28 3
F37-9 50 115 32 11
F40-1 53 112 28 14
F47-8 55 113 27 30
F50-1 52 111 29 22
M20-2 54 110 25 23
M53-5 49 102 29 22
M57 49 111 28 20
33 28
29.25 (2.49) 17.58 (7.95)
27.94 (2.73) 14.00 (4.74)
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Fig. 4. Mean RTs for the aligned vs. unaligned condition for controls and prosopag-
T
P
sM60-1 58 118
Mean (SD) (n=12) 52.58 (2.68) 113.83 (5.20)
Controls (n=17)
Mean (SD) 52.00 (4.03) 114.29 (3.41)
M=80.45%) and happiness, disgust, and surprise from the bottom halves presented
lone (M=86.54%).
Aligned face composites were created by combining the top of an expression
ell-recognised from the top half of the face (i.e., anger, fear, sadness) with the
ottom of an expression well-recognised from the bottom (i.e., happiness, disgust,
urprise) of the same individual (see Fig. 1b). All nine possible combinations were
ormed for each of the four individuals, for a total of 36 aligned composites; there
ere thus, for example, 12 “happy”-target aligned trials, 4 where the happy expres-
ion was combined with anger on the top, 4 where happy was combined with fear
n the top, and 4 where happy was combined with sadness. Unaligned composites
ere created by horizontally misaligning the top and bottom halves of the stimuli
hat were used to create the aligned composites so that the middle of the nose in
he top segment was aligned with the edge of the face in the bottom segment. For
alf of the stimuli the top segment was shifted to the left of the bottom segment,
hile for the other half the top segment was shifted to the right. As neither the top
or bottom half of the unaligned images were centred on the screen, we therefore
resented half of the aligned composites in the same position as the left segment
f the aligned composites and half in the same position as the right segment of the
naligned composites.
.3.2. Procedure
The experiment commenced with a block of trials in which participants cat-
gorised the facial expression of each of the four whole faces posing each of the
ix facial expressions (24 trials) by pressing one of six labelled keys (anger, happi-
ess, sadness, fear, surprise, disgust). This was then followed by one of two blocks:
n one block participants were required to classify the facial expression depicted
n the top half of the aligned and unaligned composites (as either anger, fear or
adness) via a key press, whereas in the other block, they were asked to classify
he bottom half (as either happiness, surprise or disgust). Within each block, each
ligned and unaligned composite was presented once, in a random order, for a total
f 72 trials per block. Block order was counterbalanced between participants. Prior
o commencing each block, participants classiﬁed an isolated top (or bottom) half
f each individual displaying each expression (12 trials), and then 10 practice trials
ith the face halves combined into composites (half aligned, half unaligned). Each
rial began with a ﬁxation cross for 500ms, followed by a 500ms blank interval, and
hen the compositewas presenteduntil a responsewasmade. An inter-trial-interval
f 1000ms preceded the commencement of the following trial. Participants were
sked to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. Stimulus presentation was
ontrolled by SuperLab (Cedrus Corp.) on a MacBook Pro with a 15-in. monitor, at a
iewing distance of approximately 50 cm. Aligned composites were approximately
.5 cm×5.5 cm (4×6.5 degrees of visual angle) and unaligned were 5 cm×5.5 cm
5.5×6.5 degrees of visual angle).
.3.3. Results
Given the high accuracy rates on both our composite tasks, our analyses focus
n response times (RTs) (percentage accuracy for the expression composite task is
able 2
ercent accuracy for thealignedvs. unalignedconditions for controls andprosopagnosics, f
urprise, disgust) of a composite (standard errors, adjusted for within-subject compariso
Top
Aligned Unaligne
Controls 85.65 (1.38) 87.82 (1.
Prosopagnosics 82.83 (2.56) 84.25 (2.nosics, for expressions recognised from the top (anger, fear, sadness) and bottom
(happiness, surprise, disgust) of a composite. Standard error bars are shown
(adjusted for within-subject comparisons).
displayed in Table 2). Analysed RTs were for correct trials, excluding responses 3
SDs greater than the mean for each condition. Mean RTs were calculated for aligned
and unaligned composites, for expressions judged from either the top (anger, fear,
sadness) or the bottom (happiness, disgust, surprise) face half. Results (Figs. 4 and 5)
showed a weaker expression composite effect in the CP group than in controls,
particularly for top-half expression judgements, with even controls showing quite
a small composite effect for bottom-half judgements. Supporting statistics were as
follows.
A Group (prosopagnosics, controls)×Alignment (aligned, unaligned)×Half
(top, bottom) ANOVA revealed main effects of Half, F(1,27) =95.39, p< .001,
or expressions recognised fromthe top (anger, fear, sadness) andbottom(happiness,
ns in parentheses).
Bottom
d Aligned Unaligned
38) 92.35 (1.46) 95.35 (1.46)
56) 96.33 (1.12) 96.92 (1.12)
R. Palermo et al. / Neuropsycholo
Fig. 5. Normalised RT scores for expressions recognised from the top (anger, fear,
sadness) and bottom (happiness, surprise, disgust) of a composite for each control
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[(aligned−unaligned)/(aligned+misaligned)]. On this measure, the magni-
tude of the identity composite effect was signiﬁcantly weaker for prosopagnosics
than controls, z=1.37, p< .05, r= .15 (Fig. 7). We also note that the baseline-
adjusted composite effect was signiﬁcant (i.e., greater than zero), for both controls,
t(29) =9.43, p< .001 and CPs, t(8) = 3.21, p< .02.nd prosopagnosic. Means and SEMs displayed for each group.
2
p = 0.78, and Alignment, F(1,27) =35.12, p< .001, 2p = 0.57, moderated by
n Alignment×Half interaction, F(1,27) =12.54, p< .001, 2p = 0.32. The interac-
ion reﬂected a larger composite effect for top (aligned: M=2244, SE =134;
naligned: M=1856, SE =106) than bottom (aligned: M=1324, SE =72; unaligned:
=1183, SE =59) halves, although composite effects for both halves were sta-
istically signiﬁcant, t’s > 5.27, p’s < .001. The Group×Alignment×Half interaction
pproached signiﬁcance, F(1,27) =3.78, p= .06, 2p = 0.12, and most importantly,
he Group×Alignment interaction was signiﬁcant, F(1,27) =4.33, p< .05, 2p = 0.14.
omposite effects were evident for both groups, but signiﬁcantly larger for con-
rols, (aligned:M=1897, SE =123;unaligned:M=1539, SE =97), t(16) =6.55,p< .001,
han prosopagnosics (aligned: M=1671, SE =147; unaligned: M=1499, SE =116),
(11) =2.35, p< .04 (see Fig. 4).
We also calculated the magnitude of the expression composite effect for
ach individual participant. To normalize for differences in baseline perfor-
ance these were calculated as the relative difference in performance across
onditions [(aligned−unaligned)/(aligned+misaligned)] (see Ramon, Busigny, &
ossion, 2010 for a similar procedure with an acquired prosopagnosic P.S.).
iven these data were skewed we used a non-parametric test suited to small
ample sizes, the Kolmogorov–Smirnov Z (Field, 2009). The magnitude of the
omposite effect for expressions displayed by the top half of the face was
igniﬁcantly weaker for prosopagnosics than controls, z=1.43, p< .04, r= .27
Fig. 5). There was no signiﬁcant difference between the prosopagnosic andgia 49 (2011) 1226–1235 1231
control groups for expressions displayed by the bottom half, z= .79, p= .55,
r= .15.4
In sum, thegroupofCPs clearly showacompositeeffect for expression.However,
the magnitude of the composite effect was signiﬁcantly reduced for CPs compared
to controls.
2.4. Identity composite test
2.4.1. Stimuli and procedure
The identity composite effect stimuli were created by Le Grand, Mondloch,
Maurer, and Brent (2004), who split photographs of unexpressive grayscale faces
horizontally across the middle of the nose into top and bottom halves. The halves
were recombined into different individuals thatwere aligned into an intact face, and
spatially unaligned, with the top half of each face shifted to the left. The procedure
was very similar to Le Grand et al. (2004, 2006). In brief, on each trial two face com-
posites were sequentially presented (200ms, with a 300ms inter-stimulus interval)
and participants judged whether the top halves were the same or different identity
(the bottom halves were always different). A block of aligned composites (48 trials;
half same top halves and half different top halves, randomly intermixed) was fol-
lowed by a block of unaligned composites (also 48 trials) (note that block order does
not affect performance, Le Grand et al., 2004). Four practice trials were presented
prior to each block. Participants were asked to respond as quickly and accurately as
possible. Stimulus presentation was controlled using SuperLab (Cedrus Corp.) on a
Dell PC (19-in.monitor) or aMacBookPro (15-in.monitor) fromadistanceof approx-
imately 50 cm. Aligned composites were approximately 5 cm×7.5 cm (5.5×8.5
degrees of visual angle) and unaligned were 8.5 cm×7.5 cm (9.5×8.5 degrees of
visual angle).
[Note that there has been recent discussion in the literature (e.g., Richler,
Gauthier, Wenger, & Palmeri, 2008) about whether the traditional same-different
version of the composite task, as used here, might tap a response bias to say
“same” rather than the perceptual composite illusion. We chose to use the tradi-
tional version rather than the Gauthier-lab version involving additional conditions
(e.g., Richler et al., 2008, 2011, in press) for several reasons. (a) A recent ERP study
using the traditional conditions and monitoring for same-different changes as the
behavioural task showed the composite effect was present early in visual process-
ing (i.e., on the N170); this demonstrates a perceptual rather than decisional locus
(Kuefner, Jacques, Prieto, & Rossion, 2010). (b) The particular Le Grand et al. (2004)
stimulus set we used here has been conﬁrmed to show the expected pattern of a
large traditional composite effect upright in combination with no composite effect
at all for the same faces inverted (Mondloch & Maurer, 2008); this demonstrates
that the composite effect (misaligned− aligned difference for same trials) does not
reﬂect a generalised bias to say ‘same’ more often to aligned trials. Also, (c) the
Gauthier-lab version produces a large “composite effect” (i.e., congruency effect)
for inverted faces (Richler et al., 2011), despite the lack of any perceptual illusion of
integration of the two halves inverted (e.g., Young et al., 1987).]
2.4.2. Results
Mean RTs (for correct trials, excluding responses 3 SDs greater than the mean
for each condition) were calculated for aligned and unaligned composites, for trials
where the identities were the same, and ones where they were different. As is gen-
eral practice, only the same trialswere used to test for the presence of the composite
effect (c.f., LeGrandet al., 2004;Robbins&McKone, 2007) (meanRTs fordifferent tri-
als and percent accuracy for same and different trials are shown in Table 3). A Group
(prosopagnosics, controls)×Alignment (aligned, unaligned) ANOVA showed a com-
posite effect, with slower RTs in the aligned (M=960, SE =39) than the unaligned
(M=767, SE =26) condition, F(1,37) =43.93, p< .0001, 2p = 0.54 (see Fig. 6). There
was no Group×Alignment interaction, F(1,37) =1.06, p> .3. However, the most
important result of the ANOVA was a marginal main effect of Group F(1,37) =2.86,
p= .099, 2p = 0.07, with prosopagnosics slower than controls, and an a priori com-
parison of the unaligned “baseline” condition showed that the prosopagnosics were
signiﬁcantly slower forunaligned trials thancontrols, t(37) =2.50,p< .02. Thismeans
that the comparison of composite effects via the interaction in the ANOVA on raw
scores is invalid, because it fails to take into account that controls, having a faster
baseline RT, have theoretically less room to show a composite effect than CPs yet
show a trend on the raw scores to showing a larger composite effect than CPs.
Thus, as for the expression composite effect, the baseline-
adjusted magnitude of the identity composite effect was calculated4 Given that happy faces are typically recognized more accurately/rapidly than
other expressions, we also analysed the bottom-half-target condition leaving out
the happy-target trials. The results did not change: there was still no difference in
baseline adjusted composite effect scores for CPs and controls, z= .57, p= .90.
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Table 3
Percent accuracy for same-identity trials and percent accuracy and mean RTs for different-identity trials (standard errors, adjusted for within-subject comparisons in
parentheses).
Same-identity trials Different-identity trials
Percent accuracy Percent accuracy Mean RTs (ms)a
Aligned Unaligned Aligned Unaligned Aligned Unaligned
Controls 80.97 (2.74) 91.37 (2.74) 81.53 (2.98) 80.27 (2.98) 940 (27) 806 (27)
80.56
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tion duration of faces. However, this is also true of the identity
recognition tests used to diagnose the prosopagnosia: all our
CPs were impaired either on a Famous Faces Test (unlimited
stimulus duration) and/or the CFMT (6 s to learn each person;Prosopagnosics 80.56 (4.07) 92.60 (4.07)
a One prosopagnosic (M53-5) was excluded as his mean RTs were consistently lo
We also brieﬂy examined the correlation, within the group of CPs (n=9),
etween the size of their identity composite effect and the size of their expression
omposite effect for the top-half (both using baseline-adjusted scores). We used a
on-parametric test, Kendall’s tau (), which assesses the probability that the data
re in the sameorder for the two variables, andhas a range between−1 to 1 (StatSoft
nc, 2010). This correlationwas small (althoughpositive) andnon-signiﬁcant,  = .17,
= .27, 1-tailed. Note, however, that we would not wish to rule out an association
etween these variables, given the low power with the small sample size. (Unfortu-
ately, we were unable to conduct similar correlational analyses with the controls,
ecause those who completed the identity composite task did not complete the
ther task.)
In sum, the results for identity are very similar to those for expression. That is,
he identity composite effect for CPs is evident, but weaker.
. Discussion
None of the 12 CPs we assessed was impaired on any of the
hree tests of basic and social facial expression recognition. These
bjective test scores agree with the CPs’ subjective reports of
heir everyday experience: all reported difﬁculty recognising facial
dentity (e.g., difﬁculty following ﬁlms due to confusion about
racking the characters) but none reported difﬁculty recognis-
ng facial expression. Intact expression with impaired identity
ecognition is consistent with other studies (e.g., Duchaine et al.,
003; Humphreys et al., 2007), suggesting that this pattern may
e common in CP. Note that we cannot rule out a subtle deﬁcit
n expression recognition emerging in CPs had they been tested
ig. 6. Mean RT for the aligned vs. unaligned condition for controls and prosopag-
osics on the same-identity composite effect trials. Standard error bars are shown
adjusted for within-subject comparisons).(2.84) 79.63 (2.84) 1043 (45) 928 (45)
han the other participants: 2690ms (aligned) and 5706ms (unaligned).
on speeded expression recognition tasks. Importantly, however,
the dissociation between expression and identity observed here
cannot be attributed to differences in stimulus presentation dura-
tion. The expression tasks (Emotion Hexagon, Ekman 60, Reading
the Mind in the Eyes) use long (>5 s) or unlimited presenta-Fig. 7. Normalised RT scores for the identity composite for each control and
prosopagnosic. Means and SEMs displayed for each group.
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nlimited presentation duration at test). Thus, it is unlikely that
generic strategy which is easier to implement with long stim-
lus durations (e.g., sequential feature-by-feature analysis), can
ccount for the dissociation between expression and identity
ecognition.
Our ﬁrst question was to determine whether normal levels of
acial expression recognition in our CPs were obtained via the use
f normal perceptual mechanisms. Although our CPs did show
olistic coding for expression, it wasweaker than that seen for con-
rols. This group of CPs also demonstrated normal facial expression
ecognition despite their weak holistic coding. Thus, they must be
elying upon compensatory mechanisms that are either atypical
i.e., not used at all by controls) or typical but used to different
egrees by controls (i.e., heavier use of non-holistic mechanisms
n CP). This latter idea is plausible because there may be multiple
ffective expression recognition mechanisms (which may be less
he case for identity recognition), some of which involve holistic
oding but others which may involve focusing on single facial fea-
ures (such as an upturnedmouth for happiness; Ellison &Massaro,
997) and/or “embodied cognition”, involving internal simulation
f the emotion in somatosensory brain regions (Pitcher, Garrido,
alsh,&Duchaine, 2008). CPs couldbeusing a subset of theseother
trategies, but relying on themmore heavily than controls. Regard-
ess of the precise mechanism relied upon by CPs, weak holistic
oding implies that CPs were not recognising facial expressions in
he same manner as controls.
The second question addressed by the current study was the
ocus of the dissociation between identity and expression recog-
ition. The pattern of results for holistic coding of identity and
xpression were similar: CPs showed holistic coding, but it was
eaker than in controls for both facial attributes. This result sup-
ortsModel B (Fig. 2), inwhich there is an initial holistic processing
tage that is common to both identity and expression. This stage
f general holistic coding may be very early, with recent evidence
or identity composite effects as early as 170ms after stimulus
nset (i.e., the face-sensitive N170 event-related potential, Jacques
Rossion, 2009, 2010; Letourneau & Mitchell, 2008). This early
eneral holistic processing stage may also encompass other facial
ttributes in addition to identity and expression, given that com-
osite effects are also seen for judgements of sex and attractiveness
Abbas & Duchaine, 2008; Baudouin & Humphreys, 2006; Zhao &
ayward, 2010).
The third question we examined was whether holistic pro-
essing for identity is functionally related to face identiﬁcation
bility. Consistent with proposals that holistic coding contributes
o face recognition, we found that the identity composite effect
as weaker in CPs (who by deﬁnition are very poor at recognising
ace identity) than in controls (who we conﬁrmed were normal
t recognising face identity). Weak holistic coding of identity is
lso seen in other groups of individuals with developmental dis-
rders affecting face perception. A group of 12 individuals who
ere deprived of early patterned visual input by bilateral congen-
tal cataracts for 3–6 months after birth displayed a signiﬁcantly
maller composite effect when assessed with essentially the same
omposite test as used here (Le Grand et al., 2004). Group stud-
es of adolescents with autism, a neurodevelopmental disorder
n which individuals often display face identity and expression
ecognition impairments (Sasson, 2006; Wilson et al., 2010), also
eveal impaired holistic coding, as measured with the composite
ffect (Gauthier, Klaiman, & Schultz, 2009; Teunisse & de Gelder,
003). Our claim that holistic coding contributes to identity recog-
ition is not supported by Konar et al.’s (2010) study of individual
ifferences across the normal population. However, as noted ear-
ier, associations may have been masked by the use of a face
atching, rather than recognition memory, task. Richler et al.
in press) did not observe a relationship between face recogni-gia 49 (2011) 1226–1235 1233
tion ability on the CFMT and strength of the identity composite
effect assessed via the traditional same-different version of the
composite task (but note that n=34). They did ﬁnd a relationship
between CFMT scores and the Gauthier-lab version (‘congruency
effect’; but see earlier note for discussion of limitations of this ver-
sion). As such, the present study is the ﬁrst to show a relationship
between face recognition ability and strength of the standard com-
posite effect. This leaves open the possibility that the relationship
only becomes apparent with a wide range of CFMT scores (avail-
able when including CPs) and is either absent or more difﬁcult
to observe in the smaller range afforded by the normal popula-
tion.
We note that the holistic processing deﬁcits seen in our study
of CPs are milder than those reported in acquired prosopagnosia.
In acquired prosopagnosia, case studies have reported a complete
lack of holistic coding, for both expression (Case H.J.A., Baudouin
& Humphreys, 2006) and identity (Case P.S., Ramon et al., 2010).
The difference in results may be related to severity of prosopag-
nosia. That is, the acquired prosopagnosics tested to date recognise
few if any faces (H.J.A. and P.S. identiﬁed less than 1% of famous
faces, Baudouin & Humphreys, 2006; Rossion et al., 2003), and dis-
play negligible levels of holistic coding,while CPswho can typically
recognise a modest proportion of faces (e.g., the CPs in our present
study recognised 33% of famous faces on average), have weak but
not completely absent holistic coding. Our ﬁnding of weak, but not
absent, holistic coding in CP may be consistent with suggestions
that CPs are at the lower end of a continuum with normals, of both
holistic processing, and of face identity recognition abilities (see
Bowles et al., 2009 for discussion).
It is also important to note that we do not wish to argue that
weak holistic coding is the only, or even primary, deﬁcit in CP. First,
our CPs did show holistic coding, albeit weaker than controls on
average. Second, Figs. 5 and 7 suggest there may be heterogene-
ity between individuals: some individual CPs in the current study
appear to display normal levels of holistic coding of expression or
identity. For identity, this has also been reported in previous stud-
ies (Le Grand et al., 2006; Schmalzl et al., 2008), although we note
that composite ﬁndings from individual participants cannot neces-
sarily be taken as reliable from a single composite test, given that
the internal reliability of this task is generally not high (e.g., split-
half reliability = .65 in Zhu et al., 2010), and thus evidence of normal
holistic processing in individual CPswould thus ideally require con-
ﬁrmation from two or more versions of an identity (or expression)
composite task.
To summarise, our CPs as a group displayed normal facial
expression recognition, together with impaired facial identity
recognition, and weakened holistic processing of both expression
and identity. The expression ﬁndings suggest an increased use of
compensatory non-holistic strategies for expression recognition.
The identityﬁndings support a view that holistic coding is function-
ally involved in face identiﬁcation. Finally, the ﬁndings involving
expression and identity in concert, are consistent with a model
proposing a general, early, holistic coding stage for multiple facial
attributes.
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